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Abstract
Many discourses tend to consider change in techniques as the main trigger for social
change and economic development. This paper proposes the original hypothesis that the
development of new techniques occurs at the end of a long lasting societal process, not as
its cause. The rising of the knowledge society since the 17th century is engaged today in
what we called the medial turn – defined as a cultural shift through the generalized digital
communication. This process is the conclusive stage in the modernization process of soci‐
eties conceived as positive-sum-game networks. Based on MacLuhan’s famous idea that
the “medium is the message”, we address a few questions specialists and engineers are to
be confronted to in the medial age.
Keywords: technique, engineering, digital media, knowledge society
1. Introduction
The impact of the form of the media had more structuring effects in the domains of scientific
interaction and cooperation than anywhere else in the field of social communication. The
“global village” emphasized by Marshall McLuhan (1967)(1) 50 years ago, which has been
largely criticized and ironized by his bygones at the time, has now become the overall reality.
It is possible to define it as a scientific global village without borders, centers, or authorities.
But this paradigmatic shift is generally considered either as the expression of the ultraliberal
ideology (as a particular expression of the Hayekian “Grand Society”) or as a simple expansion
of dematerialized communication in “reflexive modernity” (Anthony Giddens). All this is not
false, but it is merely reductive because what really happens today is the emergence of a third
form of communication we are far from understanding properly. The most cautious attitude
toward this shift is a humble heuristics with a great portion of skepticism regarding linear
historicity—which always considers the new as the continuation of the old in another form—
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and some epistemological creativity more interested in original questioning than in preserving
certainties.
2. The medium is (also) the message
The form of a media dwells in its technological hardware. What McLuhan asserts with his
legendary formula is more than the classical Aristotelian hylemorphism that postulates the
nondissociation of form and content; it is actually its complete turnaround. McLuhan never
said that the medium is a message as such, but only that the form of a given message could be
completely different if the medium changed, e.g., if a roman law expressed in simple scriptur‐
ality is translated into mechanical scripturality at the Gutenberg Age. The first step to be taken,
if we want to investigate this transformation in the meaning of the message, is to consider how
this new kind of communication functions in technological terms. In other words, how the
hardware determines the software. Traditionally, technicians and engineers were supposed to
understand how things work and perform to their best. But if we read McLuhan correctly, it is
much more than that. One could infer that their real job refers to (or at least should) the way
their artifacts open a field to meaningfulness, whose options are, afterwards, constructed by
social forces. It is well known now that the invention of the wheel by Inca engineers or handymen
never ended linearly in new forms of circulation and territorial policies [2,3], but was simply
(but is this so simple?) used as a tool for new toys. The main difference between the Inca
handyman and the engineer of our medial age is that the handyman was never asked to imagine
what kind of options and meanings his invention could acquire, whereas the contemporary
engineer, on the contrary, has to assume this important effort. The point is that this effort is not
necessary because of the universal accessibility of information, not even (!) because of the risks
that technological innovations carry on; the point is, let aside that nobody else could perform
this effort, this is (or should be) part of his or her scientific responsibility.
Another point should be mentioned too. We could argue that this mission is assumed by
prospective studies that could be part of the education and the professional training of the
engineers. But that is only the obvious, shallow part of the problem. The most important function
is, in fact, to outline all the possible options opened by hardware techniques; we refer to what
we could call the aesthetic part of technical investigation. When the perspective was discov‐
ered during the Quattrocento in Italy, nobody could imagine what kind of consequences this
new representation technique could have in mathematics, physics, and, especially, in practi‐
cal arts like architecture. It was necessary to wait for Erwin Panofsky [4] to understand the link
between all these disciplines and arts. It took five centuries for the relation between this invention
and its consequences to be seriously understood. No need to say that such delays are nowa‐
days impossible to accept.
3. From power to knowledge
Since Arnold J. Toynbee, human history can be periodized in three different societal regimes:
(1) nomadic hunter gatherers, (2) traditional societies, and (3) modernity. The most important
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sociological question is to understand how these societal regimes establish their cohesion.
While nomadic societies are hold together through a strong symbiosis between actors, society,
and environment, all integrated by ties of symbolic exchange, traditional societies mainly
reproduce their synthesis by the media of power [4]. The particularity of this media is that it
cannot be shared, you have the power or you have it not. If you lose it, somebody else would
get it and reversely. In this sense, power is a resource for a zero-sum-game. Power must be
legitimated. Since human agents are led by conscience and not by their instincts, situations of
big risk of societal collapse excepted, this legitimation can only be reasonably asserted and
universally admitted if a transcendent dimension guarantees power relations. In other words,
God’s will is the guarantee to legitimate social hierarchy. Due to the astronomic discoveries in
the late 16th century, which drew scholastic thinking into deep contradictions between its
Aristotelian frame and the newly discovered realities, the transcendent dimension backed
away, especially in Europe [5]. The everlasting wars during all this century began to embody
again the figure of a Deus absconditus, a hidden God who turns his back on humanity, away
from the consequences of the misusages of human free will. This situation of a complete
contingency is unique in human history. In the absence of God, humans had no other choice
but to use their own reason (which is, after Augustinus, a gift of God) to master a kind of social
order, to avoid collapse, and in other words, to share their reason and knowledge in order to
figure and end to disorder and war. Instead of the transcendent divine will, a new world had
to be created, imagined through the immanence of reason. But this new way to manage human
affairs involved another resource than power, i.e., reason and knowledge. This is the turning
point: reasonable knowledge is a resource for positive-sum-games, totally different from the
zero-sum-power fuelled games. And there is more. If done properly —and this is an institu‐
tional issue of paramount importance—sharing knowledge between two or more sources gives
place to a synergetic effect. This effect can only be reached if ideas and reasons have the
freedom to circulate. So, the knowledge society has its roots in the early Enlightenment. It
fueled the process of individualization and rationalization supported by the proofs that their
synergetic answers were capable to create social order in God’s vacancy.
Modernity is not a creation of scientists, technicians, lawyers or philosophers; it is the creature
of the positive-sum-game. Under given conditions, this game is the chance to interconnect
different kinds of knowledge in order to achieve new solutions and innovations. The mislead‐
ing idea was that the man is a homo faber. He is that indeed. But he was a homo faber during
all his history and did not wait the late 16th century to develop his abilities and it is, therefore,
important to acknowledge that these competences began to be cumulative and synergetic only
as parts of a positive-sum-game. This means that by essence knowledge sharing opposes to
power games. Knowledge is the only win-win game possible. Alas, the dark side of the process
is that, if human transactions are considered under this light, there is no limit in human material
needs. The Greek called this illimitation pleonexia, which is the mother of all Hybris, the loss
of measure. It is insofar a perversion of “human nature” since the material universe, in any
traditional society, must be conceived as a strictly limited and ordered cosmos. The conception
of unlimited goods is impossible in the mind frame of such a cosmos. Thus, whereas the
synergetic effects achieve Enlightenment and all the modern achievements in the ideational
world, this process has its shadowy or even cursed side in the illimitation of the material world.
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Parallel to the elaboration of knowledge society during the 17th century, this new paradigm
of human transactions gives place to what we call “risk society” since Ulrich Beck in late
modernity.
Another consequence of the positive-sum-society is individualization. Even if freedom of will
and action is certainly the most important normative achievement of modernity, this constit‐
utive part of the individualization process has its dark side too. In a traditional zero-sum-
society, social ties are strong and give human beings a kind of ontological security they cannot
afford anymore. Social ties are strong in the traditional world because everything in the “great
chain of being” (Arthur O. Lovejoy), which forms its cosmos, is linked by relations of indebt‐
edness, especially among humans. And, the social logic of zero-sum-games is the imbalance
of cost and benefits in every form of transaction. If (A) makes a profit (a+) on the costs of (B),
(a+) and (b−) are equivalents under the condition that in a further transaction (A) has to carry
the costs and (B) will profit on histurn—either as a reduced (A/B) or enlarged form of exchange
(A/B/C….A). Under the condition of positive-sum-game, (a) and (b) are not in a relation of
indebtedness, but of mutual profit, either in a reduced dual (a+) ⇒ (b+) or in collective form (a
+) ⇒ (b+) ⇒ (c+), etc., like in Mandeville’s fable of the bees (1704), where private vices contribute
to public virtue. In such a situation, social (debt) bonds are replaced by the individual pursuit
of profit, happiness or vice. This pursuit is moral insofar, as the individual advantage (a+) can
be considered as the condition for (b+) or (c+). This is the exact definition of individuality. In
other words, the price of freedom is not just loneliness, but also the ontological insecurity. In
place of God, modern individualistic societies placed the ongoing process of Mandeville’s
fable.
The two pillars of modernity, illimitation of goods and individualization, share obviously the
same root; and insofar, the two dark sides of these pillars, the ecological collapse due to
unlimited growth and social loneliness, are coming from the same origin. Unfortunately, this
origin has hardly been unveiled.
4. Orality, scripturality, and beyond
But let’s get back to our initial concern, the form of communication. If we consider its history
we can distinguish one shift and a half—and possibly another full shift occurring today. The
first and most important shift is the passage from orality to scripturality, from the word to the
letter [6,7]. Besides the obvious effects of this transformation—from direct to indirect commu‐
nication, from immediate to mediated proof, from concretion to abstraction, etc., —Walter J.
Ong and Jack Goody underscore its cognitive effects in the direction that, once again, the
medium is the message. Literacy, as training to read linearly from one side to another and from
above to below, transforms the perception and understanding of the world while restructuring
our brains. Once we have learnt how to read, we live in another world than in the oral one, by
forgetting the memory of the former world. Another shift occurred when Johannes Gutenberg
invented his printing machine. Here too the consequences were of unexpected relevance. The
dereliction of high literacy (Latin and Greek) in favor of the lingua franca homogenizes
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territories and, according to Anderson [8] builds the modern nationalist imaginary. Not to
speak about the protestant schism, the democratization of knowledge, the formation of the
public sphere, and, last but not least, the production of paper money. The whole process of
secularization relies on this invention. In clear words, it is this invention that renders possible
the modern positive-sum-society. Gutenberg was a genius handyman; he should have had the
speculative intelligence of a Copernicus to draw conclusions about his invention. Both lived
at the same time. We can only speculate about what would have happened if they had actually
met.
Our intention in this short essay is to highlight the opportunity of a third revolution in the
form of communication that we call the medial turn. By medial turn we understand the
computerization of communication through electronic social networks and devices. The main
differences between scriptural and medial communication are as follows:
1. The material supports are not anymore paper, pens, books, libraries, archives, newspa‐
pers, or bookshops, but hardware and software, electronic networks and architectures,
and so on.
2. Immaterial issues as grammatical skills, knowledge, memory, patience, interiority,
rhetoric capacities, or linear thinking are replaced by algorithms, googling, iconic
capacities, high-speed competences, flexibility, ubiquitous abilities, constant updates,
personal flexibility, etc.
3. Instead of linear communication, the medial world performs reticular through growing
and more and more interconnected networks; besides this spatial effect, communication
excludes the factor time by instantaneity.
4. On the cognitive level, the patient linear and causal thinking is replaced by high-speed
rhizomatic and simultaneous cognitive structures.
The following four options should therefore be tested:
1. The medial turn is just a continuation of the Gutenberg-galaxy: there is no McLuhan-
galaxy; scripturally is the last word in human communication; it is the posthistoric
hypothesis.
2. The medial turn fulfills the program of scripturality; it is a qualitative shift of scripturality
due to computerized devices; mediality fulfills scripturality; we can speak about as the
hypothesis of reflexive modernity.
3. Mediality is per se a revolution in human communication; literally, communication is
replaced by icons and numbers; we can call it that the postmodern hypothesis.
4. “Gutenberg” was only the first step in a process we largely ignore and we only named
“modernity” by default; this second step should help us understand what the process of
modernization really means; we call it the protomodern hypothesis (Haesler, forthcoming
2016)./11/
These four hypotheses [9,10] are all true and productive but each one from another perspective.
The main criterion to distinguish them is purely heuristic: which hypothesis generates more
The Medial Turn in Knowledge Society
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/65420
145
questions? As a matter of fact, we can neglect the first one, which is based on the “end-of-
history” assumption (Fukuyama’s thesis). It is enough to say “nothing new under the sun,”
besides the pure quantitative effect of dematerialized communication. The second one is also
heuristically poor. The only question of interest is what scripturality is missing, compared with
mediality. Obviously, it is the ubiquity of communication and the shift from the stock to the
flow of information, as underscored by Rifkin in The Age of Access [12]. As far as in the medial
age we no more have to know what, but only to know where we get the information, the Google
sphere offers us an effective relief. Due to this alleviation, we can communicate without any
local and temporal restraints. The postmodern hypothesis is the most radical one and seems
to be the richest, in heuristic (discriminant) terms. In his thesis of “singularity,” Kurzweil [13]
postulates a post- or trans-human age in which, through the “law” of Moore, machinery
intelligence supersedes the human one. But this radical perspective that scenarizes an anthro‐
pological revolution, where only a small elite of super humans will remain consistent with
machinery, while reducing the rest of humanity to “human waste” [14], is a kind of “end of
history” too; it is the proper end of human history. So, its heuristic power should be at first
eschewed for ethical reasons, but it could also be for epistemological reasons. Since the “context
of discovery,” according to Reichenbach [15], still engages human creativity (not to speak about
the “context of justification), which always has its unpredictable and imaginary part, this
anthropological revolution would exclude human nature from the whole process of discovery
and opens the door to endless algorithms.
If the hidden agenda of modernity is the substitution of zero-sum-game by positive-sum-game
structures in the medial society, the price to pay for all the synergetic effects of this sort of
games is double: (1) on the one hand the algorithmic management of every form of scarce
resources, and (2) on the other hand the reduction of human nature to a hybrid, as cynically
emphasized by the new guru of world sociology, Latour [16]. Probably, the algorithmic
management of scarce resources could not be worse than the actual agonizing muddling-
through strategy of short-term thinking politicians. On the other hand, the reduction of
humans to nothing more than cross-points in a universal network destroys their uniqueness
(mere singularity!) in all living systems, to be the only species who is conscious of the con‐
sciousness of other humans and to be aware that the others know it as well.
The hardware of the medial age is now close to perfection. According to our McLuhanian
assumption that, as the medium determines the message, the hardware will determine the
software, the only specialist to be able to imagine what kind of software could be produced
by that kind of hardware are the engineers. It is quite an understatement to say that they are
not fully aware of this responsibility.
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